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THE PARLIAMENT OF THE EXPERTS
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ABSTRACT
In the administrative state, how should expert opinions be
aggregated and used? If a panel of experts is unanimous on a question
of fact, causation, or prediction, can an administrative agency
rationally disagree, and on what grounds? If experts are split into a
majority view and a minority view, must the agency follow the
majority? Should reviewing courts limit agency discretion to select
among the conflicting views of experts, or to depart from expert
consensus? I argue that voting by expert panels is likely, on average,
to be epistemically superior to the substantive judgment of agency
heads, in determining questions of fact, causation, or prediction. Nose
counting of expert panels should generally be an acceptable basis for
decision under the arbitrary and capricious or substantial evidence
tests. Moreover, agencies should be obliged to follow the
(super)majority view of an expert panel, even if the agency’s own
judgment is to the contrary, unless the agency can give an
epistemically valid second-order reason for rejecting the panel
majority’s view.
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INTRODUCTION
In the administrative state, a great deal of agency
decisionmaking draws upon the aggregate view of a group of experts,
especially when there is an expert “consensus.” Under what
conditions is this practice sensible, or not? If experts are unanimous
on a complex question of fact, causation, or prediction, can an agency
rationally disagree, and on what grounds? If experts are split into a
majority view and a minority view, must the agency follow the
majority? Should reviewing courts limit agency discretion to select
among the conflicting views of experts, or to depart from expert
consensus?
To come to grips with these problems, I will focus on advisory
panels of scientific and technical experts and their role in
administrative law. How should the views and votes of the members
of these expert panels, whether unanimous or conflicting, be
aggregated and incorporated into agency decisionmaking and judicial
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review of agency action? The problem is ubiquitous in administrative
law; it also underlies several major episodes that, observers suggest,
illustrate the politicization of science under the Bush administration.
To structure the discussion, I will examine problems like the
following:
• In 1979, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
promulgated ozone standards that had been approved by a bare
1
majority, six of eleven members, of a scientific advisory panel;
similarly, in 1997, EPA revised its standards for ozone and particulate
matter and justified the revisions in part by reference to the
2
consensus or majority views of the panel. In 2006, however, in issuing
a final rule on particulate matter, the Administrator declined to
follow the recommendations of the same panel, in part because the
panel was not unanimous; two out of the twenty-two members had
3
dissented. Are these positions consistent? If they are not, which was
correct?
• In the second case, when twenty of twenty-two scientists on the
advisory panel recommended action that EPA declined to take,
would EPA’s decision look better or worse if the panel had been
unanimous?
• A statute gives benefits to miners who suffer from
pneumoconiosis, or black lung disease. In a black lung case, three
experts give a diagnosis that there is no pneumoconiosis, whereas two
4
experts disagree. May the administrative law judge say that the three
diagnoses outweigh the two, and award benefits on that basis? May
the judge say that the two diagnoses outweigh the three?
• The National Marine Fisheries service must decide whether to
list a genetically significant subpopulation of salmon as threatened. It
convenes a panel of sixteen scientists to decide, among other things,
whether certain technical measures will avert the danger. The panel
5
splits about evenly. Can the agency adopt either view?
Administrative law has no consistent view about how expertise
should be aggregated in cases like these. In particular, judicial
decisions are inconsistent about whether agencies may or must count

1. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
2. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355, 367, 376–79 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
3. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 71 Fed. Reg. 61,144,
61,174 n.44 (Oct. 17, 2006) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 50.6 (2008)).
4. Stalcup v. Peabody Coal Co., 477 F.3d 482, 484 (7th Cir. 2007).
5. Or. Natural Res. Council v. Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1148 (D. Or. 1998).
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noses—whether agencies may or must aggregate expertise by treating
expert views as votes, and adopting the view for which a majority or
supermajority of experts casts their votes. My major normative claim
is that nose counting by agencies is usually permissible and should
sometimes be mandatory; I mean to praise the parliament of the
experts. In some cases judges say that agencies may not count noses,
but I will say that agencies should be allowed to do so. In other cases,
I will even claim that agencies should be presumptively obligated to
adopt the views of a majority or supermajority of the experts on the
agency’s advisory panels, absent the right kind of epistemic reason for
departing from those views.
In short, administrative law sometimes, although inconsistently,
has a horror of a quantitative approach to the incorporation of
expertise, and a strong preference for a qualitative, reason-based
approach. But I will claim that when agencies are uncertain of facts,
causation, or future consequences of alternative policies, following
the consensus or majority view of experts is a perfectly rational
decisionmaking strategy. Indeed, nose counting of experts is
presumptively superior to fact-finding based on the agency’s own
substantive reasons or views, and it should prevail unless there is a
sound epistemic reason to believe that the agency is better positioned
than the expert panel to determine the relevant facts.
Much of the confusion and inconsistency surrounding these
issues is dispelled by a simple distinction between first-order reasons
and second-order reasons. First-order reasons are reasons for
thinking that a particular claim of fact, causation, or prediction is
correct. Second-order reasons are reasons for thinking that the
epistemic capacities of (a group of) experts are such that their firstorder views are more or less likely to be correct, compared to the
agency’s first-order views. When courts say that agencies who have
counted expert noses have given no valid reason for the decision, the
courts overlook that nose counting, although it offers no first-order
reason, is a perfectly rational second-order decisionmaking strategy
for agencies that lack first-order competence. Furthermore, when the
weight of expert opinion on matters of fact, causation, or prediction
tilts in one direction, agencies should be required either to follow the
expert opinion or else give a valid second-order reason to think that
expert opinion is epistemically suspect. Contrary to much of the
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current law, I suggest that the agency’s own first-order reasons are
6
not an adequate basis for departing from the expert consensus.
Part I lays out some preliminary assumptions and offers a
synopsis of relevant administrative law doctrine. Part II asks when
agencies may count noses, focusing on cases in which laws bar
agencies from counting expert noses. I suggest that nose counting,
under identifiable conditions, is a perfectly sound second-order
epistemic strategy; when those conditions are met, courts should hold
that nose counting is a rational basis for agency decisionmaking. Part
III describes the conditions under which agency nose counting is
inadequate. Part IV asks when agencies must count noses, focusing on
cases in which agencies attempt to depart from the findings reached
by a consensus or a majority of experts. I suggest an easily
implemented presumption: agencies should not be permitted to
depart from the findings of expert panels unless they can give a valid
second-order reason to think that the consensus or majority view of
experts as to matters of fact is not epistemically reliable. A brief
conclusion follows.
I. ASSUMPTIONS AND THE LAW
A. Preliminaries
Critics of the Bush administration’s decisionmaking decry the
7
“politicization” of science. The anecdotes are many, and unsettling,
but the critics are rarely clear or explicit about the theory that
underlies the critique, and the very variety of the anecdotes
underscores that the problems are highly heterogeneous. In many
8
cases, expert consensus is used as an implicit benchmark for

6. Cf. E. Donald Elliott, Strengthening Science’s Voice at EPA, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 45, 51 (Autumn 2003) (“When the scientists at EPA, such as the Science Advisory
Board, have refused to approve the Agency’s scientific rationale, a court should consider that
refusal in giving lesser deference to the agency’s decision.”). Although I agree with the broad
thrust of Elliott’s suggestion, I hope to make the idea of “lesser deference” more precise, in part
by distinguishing between the agency’s first-order reasons (which will not be a valid basis for
departing from the expert panel’s recommendations) and the agency’s second-order reasons
(which may be a valid basis for doing so, under some identifiable conditions).
7. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB and the Politicization of Risk Assessment, 37 ENVTL.
L. 1083, 1084 (2007) (discussing “[t]he [Bush] administration’s efforts to politicize science”).
8. Shapiro offers two examples of “science denial” and “politicization” by the Bush
administration. Shapiro, supra note 7, at 1086–87. The first is that the administration “refus[ed]
to acknowledge or act on the overwhelming scientific evidence of global climate change . . . .”
Id. at 1086. In the second, “[t]he Food and Drug Administration . . . refused to approve the
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determining that science has been politicized, yet that benchmark is
undertheorized.
Somewhat paradoxically, I believe that the best response to this
heterogeneity is to focus on a crucial subset of the relevant issues. If
the subset is well chosen, it will illuminate the structure of the
broader problem while avoiding the morass of detail in which these
critiques sometimes sink. Accordingly, I focus on the relationship
between agencies and the scientific and technical panels that advise
them, and on judicial review of agency action involving decisions that
9
follow or reject the recommendation of an expert panel.
Some preliminary assumptions are necessary to clarify the
questions. I will assume that agency policymaking is a two-stage
process, encompassing both fact-finding and evaluation. At the first
stage the agency finds “facts”—namely, discrete adjudicative facts,
background conditions or legislative facts, causal theories, and
predictions about the consequences of alternative policies. Expertise,
in this framework, just means a higher probability of getting the facts
right.
Once the facts are determined, agencies decide what to do given
those facts. At this second stage, agencies apply some decision rule
determined either by their own preferences or by the preferences of
Congress and the president, in some mix. Expertise has no relevance
at this second stage, which involves the application to the facts of
values or preferences as to which there may be irreducible conflict or
disagreement. This is, of course, a hopelessly simplified picture of the
policymaking process. However, the simplification is useful for my
purposes, which are legal and normative rather than conceptual. I do
not aim to give a philosophically adequate account of the elements of
public choice, but rather to make sense of the relationship between
agencies and expert panels in the administrative state, under extant
statutes. As we will see, this distinction between expert fact-finding
and agency evaluation best reconciles some major features of the
relevant statutes and of the broader legal landscape.

emergency contraceptive Plan B, despite the fact that two scientific advisory committees had
overwhelmingly found that the drug was safe and effective.” Id. at 1086–87.
9. Given this comparison between expert panels and agencies, I put aside other
mechanisms for decisionmaking that might prove superior to both, such as the use of regressionbased algorithms. For an explanation, and evidence that such algorithms outperform experts
even in tasks saturated with uncertainty, see PHILIP E. TETLOCK, EXPERT POLITICAL
JUDGMENT 77 (2005).
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Within this two-stage framework, I focus solely on the first
stage—the determination of facts. Nothing in the following discussion
suggests that agencies must defer to expert panels in evaluating the
outcomes of possible policies. An example involves the recurrent
question of how agencies should set their regulatory priorities.
Reviewing courts have afforded agencies broad discretion to allocate
resources and pick their targets, even where expert advisory panels
10
have recommended a course of action. To the extent that agency
priority-setting and, more generally, agency evaluation of alternative
policies are premised on factual or causal claims or predictions as to
which expert panels have been asked to make findings, the analysis
applies in full.
A corollary is that I will bracket the question of how much
political accountability over agency decisionmaking is desirable. For
any desired level of political accountability, and for any desired
distribution of policymaking authority among Congress, the
president, and agencies, it is better, from the social point of view, to
get facts right than to get them wrong. Congressional and presidential
preferences may influence the choice of policies, given certain facts,
but they should not influence the factual component of agency
decisionmaking. There is no social benefit, and real social cost, when
an agency claims that a species is numerous when it is actually extinct,
or claims that the science surrounding climate change is uncertain
when it is not. If Congress and the president do not think that species
loss or climate change are problems worth addressing, agencies may
so decide, subject to the constraints of existing law. But agencies may
not disguise their policy preferences in the language of fact, a course
of action that hampers political accountability by making it more
difficult for legislative and executive principals to monitor the
11
agencies. In the framework I suggest, by contrast, agencies would
have incentives to openly explain their normative differences with

10. See, e.g., Int’l Union, UAW v. Chao, 361 F.3d 249, 255 (3d Cir. 2004) (upholding an
Occupational Safety and Health Administration decision not to make rules to regulate
occupational exposure to machining fluids, despite an advisory committee’s contrary
recommendation, on the ground that the agency had rationally set other priorities). On the
general issue of judicial deference to agency priority-setting, see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.
497, 533–34 (2007); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985); Eric Biber, The Importance
of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 passim (2008).
11. Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 376 (1998) (“An agency
should not be able to impede judicial review, and indeed even political oversight, by disguising
its policymaking as factfinding.”).
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expert panels, producing a kind of normative transparency that
reduces the costs of monitoring their commitments and behavior.
Of course there is a blurry line between evaluation on the one
12
hand and questions of fact on the other; the two components of
agency policymaking lie on a continuum and are often intertwined.
When agencies set rates for regulated utilities, the rate that will give a
reasonable return is a question of policy sitting atop several questions
of fact. When agencies choose uncertainty parameters for estimates of
serious risks, the choice of parameter incorporates complex
judgments about the risk and harms of error in one direction or
13
another. Presumptions and burdens of proof and persuasion, as to
matters of fact, can themselves rest on agency judgments of policy.
Agencies sometimes blur the categories deliberately, engaging in a
14
“science charade” that disguises evaluation as expert fact-finding.
Nonetheless, there are good pragmatic reasons for using this
philosophically dubious distinction. The category of questions of fact
15
is written into the text and structure of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), and it pervasively shapes the doctrine of
administrative law, so there is little choice but to make the best of it.
In many cases, one can untangle value choices from factual, causal,
and predictive questions, with some work, and there are also many
clear cases of factual, causal, and predictive judgments. Whether a
black lung claimant has or will develop pneumoconiosis is
predominantly a question of fact, causation, or prediction, in any
ordinary sense of those terms. So too with the question whether
reducing the permissible level of particulate matter in the air will
result in less asthma. The line between fact and evaluation is
sometimes difficult to draw, sometimes not; the difficulty of the linedrawing exercise is not unique to this area, but it is a challenge across
all of administrative law.
12. See generally HILARY PUTNAM, THE COLLAPSE OF THE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY
ESSAYS (2002).
13. Thomas O. McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative
Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO.
L.J. 729, 748–49 (1979).
14. THOMAS O. MCGARITY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE: HOW SPECIAL
INTERESTS CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH 269 (2008) (explaining that policymakers are
“usually quite reluctant” to abandon the “science charade”); Wendy E. Wagner, The Science
Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1617 (1995) (describing the
“‘science charade,’ in which agencies exaggerate scientific contributions in setting toxic
standards to avoid accountability for underlying policy decisions”).
15. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (2006).
AND OTHER
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A common mechanism by which agencies determine facts, in
cases of any complexity, is to appeal to expert opinion. Informally,
the agency may cite studies or simply make claims about the views of
experts in the field. More formally, the agency may convene an expert
panel to offer views. In the most important cases, agencies are
obligated to do so by statute. When revising National Ambient Air
Quality Standards (NAAQS), EPA must consider the report of its
permanent Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC) and
explain any departure from the committee’s findings and
16
recommendations. Likewise, Congress established an Advisory
Commission on Childhood Vaccines (ACCV) within the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS). If the secretary of HHS
receives a recommendation from the Commission, the secretary must
either conduct a rulemaking in accordance with the recommendation
or publish a “statement of reasons” for refusing to do so in the
17
Federal Register.
The latter class of cases, for which Congress itself has set up
panels by statute or set constraints on the panels agencies may
choose, is my central focus. I will not address how expert panels
should ideally be designed, what rules they should follow, or how
their memberships should be chosen. Although these questions of
18
statutory reform and institutional design are critical, it is also
important to ask how administrative law and judicial review of agency
action should be structured given the panels that Congress and the
agencies have actually set up. As we will see, the structure,
composition, and procedures that panels use will themselves have
direct implications for administrative law and judicial review.
B. How the Law Stands
Under administrative law, how does expert consensus or
disagreement affect agency decisionmaking? Under the APA, several
legal standards can potentially become relevant in these cases, with a
great deal of overlap among them.
In agency proceedings, the default standard of proof is
19
preponderance of the evidence, unless statutes specify otherwise. I
16. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(3) (2006).
17. Id. § 300aa-14(c)(2).
18. For an excellent treatment of statutory reform and institutional design, see MCGARITY
& WAGNER, supra note 14, at 262–75.
19. See, e.g., Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 102 (1981) (interpreting 5 U.S.C. § 556(d)).
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will assume throughout that this is so, ignoring rare cases in which
statutes or constitutional rules mandate that agencies decide by clear
and convincing evidence. Once the agency has made its findings, the
APA instructs courts to set aside agency decisionmaking that is
20
“arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion.” Agencies must
always, at a minimum, offer a reasoned basis for their factual findings
and policy choices. Where proceedings are on the record, however, a
reviewing court must find substantial evidence for the agency’s
21
factual findings. The traditional understanding of the substantial
evidence standard is that the agency prevails if it offers “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
22
conclusion,” analogous to the standard of review courts use to
23
review jury findings.
It is not at all clear how much, if at all, the substantial evidence
standard of review for proceedings on the record ultimately differs
from the general arbitrary or capricious standard. Although refined
distinctions between these two standards have been drawn, the best
view, and a widespread one, is that the substantial evidence standard
is just a more specific application of the general arbitrary and
24
capricious standard; in practice, the two tend to collapse into one
25
another. Although the Supreme Court has not (yet) formally
26
endorsed this collapse, the case law often treats these standards
loosely, as a general requirement of reasoned fact-finding and
decisionmaking, and I will do the same.
In this legal setting, the views of an expert panel will be part of
the information on which the agency bases its factual findings. Under
27
the Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB decision(s), the reviewing
court is not disabled from looking behind the agency’s findings to the
20. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
21. Id. § 706(2)(E).
22. Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
23. KEITH WERHAN, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 320 (2008).
24. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. of Governors, 745 F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
25. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUIL,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 367–69 (3d ed. 1999); WERHAN, supra note 23, at 325
n.27 (collecting cases).
26. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 158 (1999) (noting the question but not resolving
it). But see Am. Paper Inst. v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 412 n.7 (1983)
(describing the arbitrary and capricious test as more lenient than the substantial evidence test).
27. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), remanded to 190 F.2d 429 (2d
Cir. 1951).
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views of the expert factfinder, such as an administrative law judge.
Rather the reviewing court can consider the expert findings as part of
the record, and overturn the agency’s findings if the agency has
inadequate reason for rejecting the view of an expert, where the
29
agency and expert disagree. Subsequently, I will argue that, under
the best reading of relevant organic statutes, and the best conception
of the interaction between those statutes and the APA’s standards for
judicial review, agencies should be obliged to give a particular type of
reason—a second-order epistemic reason—for rejecting the views of
an expert panel on matters of fact, causation, or prediction. Unless
the agency can give valid reasons to doubt the epistemic quality of the
panel’s conclusions, those conclusions should outweigh the agency’s
own judgment.
How do the APA’s standards apply under the law? What do they
entail in practice, either when an expert panel reaches consensus, or
when it has a majority and minority view? At least when an expert
panel is equally divided, the prevailing rule is that the agency can
30
adopt either view. In Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Daley,
the National Marine Fisheries Service appointed a panel of sixteen
biologists to review scientific data and determine various factual and
predictive questions bearing on whether the west coast coho salmon
was a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act. As to a
crucial issue, the panel split 8 to 8. The court accepted, as a settled
proposition, that “in the event of a scientific disagreement between
experts, the [agency] is free to rely on the expert opinion of [its]
31
choice.”
The precisely equal split on the panel makes the case somewhat
unusual, however. More often, where experts disagree, a panel
contains a clear majority view and a dissenting view. Can an agency
appeal to the majority of an expert panel, or the majority view among
experts in the field, as support for a determination of fact or of
causation? I take up this question at length in Parts II and III. The
short answer is that the cases are somewhat schizophrenic. When
28. Id. at 488.
29. For an example from the D.C. Circuit discussing American Farm Bureau Federation v.
EPA, No. 06-1410, 2009 WL 437050 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 24, 2009) (per curiam), see infra notes 85,
91–93.
30. Or. Natural Res. Council v. Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (D. Or. 1998).
31. Id. at 1159; see also, e.g., Fed. Power Comm’n v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453
(1972) (setting out this general principle and deferring to Federal Power Commission finding
where experts gave opposing testimony).
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agencies are quite formal about counting expert noses, as in the black
lung cases I will discuss, courts sometimes react in horror, saying that
nose counting is no substitute for reasoned decisionmaking. Informal
nose counting, however, goes on all the time. The cases are legion in
which agencies or, for that matter, reviewing courts appeal vaguely to
expert consensus or to what most experts or a majority of experts
hold. As I will argue, there is a good epistemic reason for that
practice.
Must an agency follow expert consensus or even the view of a
majority of experts? As I mentioned, some organic statutes, notably
the Clean Air Act (CAA), establish an expert panel and require the
agency to submit its proposed rules to the panel. Although the agency
is not obligated by statute to do what the panel says, the agency must
give an adequate reason if it rejects the findings or recommendations
32
of a panel majority. Sometimes, courts unthinkingly construe a
requirement of reason-giving as merely requiring a first-order
reason—a reasoned statement of the agency’s substantive views about
33
the factual, causal, or predictive questions at issue.
I will argue that this is mistaken, and that courts should require
the agency to give no less than a valid second-order reason: a valid
argument that the expert panel’s factual findings are epistemically
suspect, relative to that of the agency. Absent such a second-order
reason, the views of the expert panel as to factual matters should
trump the agency’s own first-order judgment, which represents
nothing more than another expert vote and, as such, is defeated by
the expert consensus or (super)majority view to the contrary, when
that exists. Nothing in my analysis, however, implies that agencies
must defer to a panel’s view about how alternative policies should be
evaluated, given the facts. As to that question, the agency’s judgment
controls, insofar as the law permits. The consequence is that the
agency will have an incentive to be clear when its decisions are based
on evaluative differences with the panel, thus making the agency’s
normative commitments transparent to outside monitors—namely,
Congress, courts, and the public.
Interestingly, although the voting rules for such panels are
usually left unclear, a simple majority of experts, rather than a
supermajority, is usually assumed to be controlling, not in the sense
that it can bind the agency without more, but in the sense that a
32. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(3) (2006).
33. See, e.g., Stalcup v. Peabody Coal Co., 477 F.3d 482, 484 (7th Cir. 2007).
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majority is entitled to state the view of the panel. As we will see, there
is a sound epistemic reason for this assumption. Under a broad range
of conditions, the views of a simple majority of experts are more
likely to be correct than the views of any other subgroup; requiring a
supermajority of experts on the panel to agree in order to force the
agency to respond with reasons would, effectively, privilege the views
of a lesser subgroup with bad epistemic consequences.
II. WHEN AGENCIES MAY COUNT NOSES
If the weight of expert opinion on the panel is X, is that an
adequately reasoned basis for the agency to find that X is the case?
For purposes of administrative law, the question is whether nose
counting amounts to nonarbitrary fact-finding in cases off the record,
or whether nose counting provides substantial evidence in cases on
the record. As these standards largely overlap, I will refer, for brevity,
to the agency’s obligation to engage in reasoned fact-finding.
A. An Example: Black Lung Benefits
Consider the dilemma that faces administrative law judges
34
deciding cases under the Black Lung Benefits Act. Roughly, the
statute gives coal miners who suffer from pneumoconiosis, or black
lung disease, a claim for benefits against the employer if the miners or
their survivors can show, among other things, that the miner
contracted pneumoconiosis and that the condition caused death or
35
disability. Administrative law judges, often faced with conflicting
diagnoses from doctors who specialize in black lung problems,
constantly attempt to resolve the cases by counting noses. And the
courts repeatedly rebuke them for doing so.
36
In a rather typical case, Stalcup v. Peabody Coal Co., five
doctors offered opinions on whether the claimant had
pneumoconiosis. The administrative law judge held that, because the
five doctors were equally qualified, numbers should prevail; because
three of the five had found that pneumoconiosis was not present, the
37
finding went against the claimant. The Seventh Circuit said that this
was unreasoned decisionmaking. Because a “scientific dispute must

34.
35.
36.
37.

30 U.S.C. §§ 901–45 (2006).
Id. § 901(a).
Stalcup v. Peabody Coal Co., 477 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 484.
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be resolved on scientific grounds,” the court underscored that
administrative law judges “must have a medical reason for preferring
39
one physician’s conclusion over another’s.” The judge:
cannot avoid the scientific controversy by basing his decision on
which side had more medical opinions in its favor. This unreasoned
approach, which amounts to nothing more than a ‘mechanical nose
count of witnesses,’ would promote a quantity-over-quality
approach to expert retention, requiring parties to engage in a race to
40
hire experts to ensure victory.

The concern expressed in the last clause, about the effects of
different decisionmaking strategies where the number of experts is up
for grabs, is a useful and potentially valid point that I will take up in
Part III below. The rest of the analysis is erroneous, although, to be
fair, the decision was for the most part following established circuit
41
precedent. It is too demanding to require the administrative law
judge to give a first-order medical reason sufficient to arbitrate
between the conflicting diagnoses of two groups of experts in the
field. “Avoiding the scientific controversy” is not a moral failing on
the part of the lay decisionmaker faced with expert disagreement; it is
a perfectly sensible epistemic strategy for lay decisionmakers who
lack first-order competence. The administrative law judges’ medical
conclusions lack any firm epistemic basis, whereas counting the noses
of experts has a clear epistemic rationale.
B. Why Count Noses?
The affirmative basis for counting noses is the theory of
decisionmaking under risk and uncertainty. Optimal decisionmaking
requires optimal information gathering. The agency’s problem is to
find facts correctly, but it cannot invest unlimited resources in doing
so. By counting the noses of experts, under certain conditions, the
agency will be able to maximize the overall quality of its decisions,
taking into account both the accuracy of its decisions and the costs of
decisionmaking.

38. Id. (quoting Peabody Coal Co. v. McCandless, 255 F.3d 465, 468 (7th Cir. 2001)).
39. Id. (quoting McCandless, 255 F.3d at 469).
40. Id. (quoting Sahara Coal Co. v. Fitts, 39 F.3d 781, 782 (7th Cir. 1994)).
41. See, e.g., Livermore v. Amax Coal Co., 297 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 2002); McCandless,
255 F.3d at 468–69; Fitts, 39 F.3d at 782; Old Ben Coal Co. v. Battram, 7 F.3d 1273 (7th Cir.
1993).

VERMEULE IN FINAL.DOC

2009]

PARLIAMENT OF THE EXPERTS

6/24/2009 8:56:48 AM

2245

What are those conditions? In particular, why should a vote of
experts be thought more epistemically reliable than the agency’s own
views? The answer lies in the rational choice theory of committee
decisionmaking. For present purposes, this body of theory can be
divided into two branches, involving the aggregation of information
that panel members possess and the acquisition of information by
those members.
I will begin with the aggregation question, best approached
through the lens of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Roughly, assume a
group of sincere voters—voters trying to get the right answer—whose
42
competence is, on average, at least slightly better than random. With
43
two choices, the voters are slightly more likely to be correct than
incorrect. In order to bracket the issue of information acquisition,
assume for the moment that the voters’ level of competence is
exogenous; it is just there.
The Jury Theorem then shows that a majority vote of this group
is increasingly likely to be correct as the size of the group increases, as
the average competence of its members increases, or as its cognitive
diversity increases, when diversity means that the biases of the
44
group’s members are negatively correlated. When the voters are
themselves experts, the second two conditions—competence and
diversity—tend to work at cross-purposes. Experts tend to have high
individual competence, but may also have highly correlated biases,
perhaps because of common professional training or because they
copy each other’s opinions. I return to these issues shortly.
For now, the key point is just that majority voting most
effectively aggregates the information dispersed among the panel of
experts. Nose counting of the assembled experts is a means by which
the agency can in effect aggregate expert views, even if the agency
itself lacks first-order competence. The conceptual mistake in
critiques of nose counting is the idea that, if the agency lacks firstorder reasons for its findings, it must be acting in an unreasoned way.

42. See Bernard Grofman, Guillermo Owen & Scott L. Feld, Thirteen Theorems in Search
of the Truth, 15 THEORY & DECISION 261, 273–74 (1983).
43. The Theorem can be extended to more than two choices, but as nothing in my
discussion depends on this wrinkle, I will assume the two-option case. Note that at least some
multiple-option cases can be reduced to two-option cases through successive pairwise
comparison.
44. Lu Hong & Scott E. Page, Some Microfoundations of Collective Wisdom 7 (May 12,
2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://telechargeu.cines.fr/3517/load/documents//
cerimes/UPL30290_Page.pdf.
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But if the agency’s nose counting is itself a rational second-order
epistemic strategy, the critique collapses.
The Jury Theorem can be extended to qualified majority, or
45
supermajority rules, but only with restrictions. It has been shown
that qualified majority rules maximize the probability of making a
correct decision, but only if the status quo is stipulated to prevail in
46
the event that no alternative garners the requisite supermajority.
This is a suspect condition in the administrative state, where the
regulatory status quo—which may just be the default common law
47
baseline—has no necessary priority, either in theory or under the
48
terms of the APA. If the status quo preference is abandoned, then a
weaker result holds: “for sufficiently large [decisionmaking
groups] . . . if the average competence of the voters is greater than the
fraction of the votes needed for passage . . . a group decision is more
likely to be correct than the decision of a single randomly chosen
49
individual.” This condition is stringent; if the decisionmaking group
uses a two-thirds majority rule, for example, then average
competence must be at least .67. Absent these conditions, the
background logic of the Jury Theorem is that majority voting is
epistemically preferred. Any lesser subgroup of decisionmakers is less
likely to be correct, given the Theorem’s other conditions; and
majority voting alone gives no privilege to the status quo, in line with
the administrative state’s general assumption that failure to regulate
when regulation is justified is as dangerous as unjustified regulation.
The problem of acquiring information merits a brief discussion.
The standard treatment of the Jury Theorem assumes that
information is exogenous. If this assumption is relaxed, it is apparent
that there is a tradeoff between the number of experts and the
epistemic quality of their views. If information is exogenous, then the
more experts, the more likely it is that the group decision will be
45. This paragraph is adapted from Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments in Legal
Theory, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (2009).
46. Ruth C. Ben-Yashar & Shmuel I. Nitzan, The Optimal Decision Rule for Fixed-Size
Committees in Dichotomous Choice Situations: The General Result, 38 INT’L ECON. REV. 175,
179–83 (1997).
47. Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 653, 656–57 (1985).
48. APA provisions treat agency action and inaction equivalently. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(13),
706(1) (2006). In practice, however, reviewing courts are more reluctant to force agency action
than to block it. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
49. Mark Fey, A Note on the Condorcet Jury Theorem with Supermajority Voting Rules, 20
SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 27, 31 (2003).
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accurate, so long as each is at least slightly better than random and
holding all else constant. However, when experts must decide how
much information to acquire—how much epistemic effort to invest in
the panel’s activities—increasing numbers make each expert less
likely to be the decisive vote, which reduces the effort each will
expend. Increasing panel size need not increase the aggregate
information panelists hold, because less information will be
50
acquired. In short, with endogenous information, experts have an
51
incentive to engage in epistemic free-riding.
This problem has at least three consequences. First, it creates an
optimization problem: institutional designers setting up committees
must trade off the quantity of panelists against the quality of their
52
contributions and votes. In most of the real-world cases I discuss,
however, Congress has set or capped the number of panel members,
or the agency has done so before the agency action giving rise to the
litigation, or the number is extrinsically determined in some other
way. I will thus bracket this set of issues. Second, the danger of
epistemic free-riding within the panel may give agencies good secondorder reasons to reject the panel’s recommendations, under
conditions where the problem is especially likely to be serious. I
return to these problems below.
Finally, the problem of endogenous information provides further
reason to think that majority rule is the best voting rule for expert
panels and the best nose counting rule for agencies attempting to take
advantage of expert opinion, at least where experts face highly
complex regulatory problems. It has been shown that, as the quality
of information decreases, so that each voter will get a very imperfect
idea of the truth even after investing effort, the optimal voting rule
53
will fall from unanimity down toward simple majority. The basic
intuition is that the larger the supermajority needed to make a
decision, such as making a finding for the agency to use, the less each
panelist will invest in acquiring information, because the imperfection

50. For this reason, polling the members of the National Academy of Sciences about a
relevant problem might well yield less information than voting within a small panel of experts
focused on the same problem. Thanks to Stuart Benjamin for raising this issue.
51. Christian List & Philip Pettit, An Epistemic Free-Riding Problem?, in KARL POPPER:
CRITICAL APPRAISALS 128, 138–40 (Philip Catton & Graham Macdonald eds., 2004).
52. Drora Karotkin & Jacob Paroush, Optimum Committee Size: Quality-Versus-Quantity
Dilemma, 20 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 429, 433 (2003).
53. Nicola Persico, Committee Design with Endogenous Information, 71 REV. ECON. STUD.
165, 167 (2004).
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of the information acquired makes it less likely that any individual
panelist will be decisive. (Imagine sitting on a twelve-member panel
that requires a unanimous vote to act. A vote only matters if all
eleven others vote identically. If the facts are highly unclear, what are
the chances that everyone will vote the same way?) If the panel faces
an extremely blurry informational environment, as it does in most of
the hard regulatory problems for which Congress or the agency has
thought an expert panel necessary, then a voting rule approaching
simple majority is likely to be best.
A similar point holds if the concern is not that experts fail to
invest in acquiring information, but rather that experts will
manipulate or distort the information they already possess in order to
produce preferred outcomes. In one illuminating model of a
54
deliberative expert committee, majority rule induces the members to
reveal their private information with less distortion than under
55
unanimity. The reason is that if a unanimous vote is necessary to
depart from the status quo, then members biased in favor of change
have strong incentives to overclaim or otherwise manipulate their
information. By contrast, majority rule minimizes the net incentives
for distortion by panel members with different biases for and against
change.
C. Alternatives
Nose counting is hardly the only second-order epistemic strategy
that the lay decisionmaker can use when confronted with
disagreement among experts. Nose counting is just one such strategy
among many. The decisionmaker can examine the relative
qualifications of the experts, giving greater weight to the more highly
qualified; the Stalcup court’s opaque preference for a qualitative
56
approach suggests this, and other cases are more explicit that
qualification weighing counts as adequately reasoned decisionmaking
57
in black lung cases where expert diagnoses disagree. Another
54. David Austen-Smith & Timothy J. Feddersen, Deliberation and Voting Rules, in
SOCIAL CHOICE AND STRATEGIC DECISIONS 269 passim (David Austen-Smith & John Duggan
eds., 2005); see also David Austen-Smith & Timothy J. Feddersen, Deliberation, Preference
Uncertainty, and Voting Rules, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 209, 210 (2006).
55. Austen-Smith & Fedderson, Deliberation and Voting Rules, supra note 54, at 273.
56. Stalcup v. Peabody Coal Co., 477 F.3d 482, 484 (7th Cir. 2007).
57. See, e.g., Old Ben Coal Co. v. Battram, 7 F.3d 1273, 1278 (7th Cir. 1993) (“The ALJ
must attempt to evaluate opinions by considering . . . the qualifications of the experts . . . and
any other relevant evidence. Because the ALJ . . . considered these factors . . . we may accept his
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approach is to examine the track records of different experts to see
whether their diagnoses were later proven true or false. Finally, the
decisionmaker can discount expert views by the known or apparent
biases of experts, who may have self-interested reasons for opining
one way or another. Where a company doctor diagnoses no disease,
and an independent doctor appointed by the court finds to the
contrary, the result is not a tie.
But the fact that nose counting is only one second-order
epistemic strategy for choosing among the conflicting views of experts
does not show that there is anything wrong with nose counting.
Depending upon the situation, it may be a perfectly sensible
approach, and indeed perhaps the only available approach. On the
facts of Stalcup, for example, the other strategies were unavailable.
The experts were equally qualified, and there is nothing in the
reported facts suggesting that some had better track records than
others. In regulatory domains of higher uncertainty and complexity
than the black lung cases, experts are especially likely to lack clear
track records because it will usually be unclear whether experts’ past
causal judgments and predictions were accurate.
In some cases, then, there is no real alternative to nose counting.
This is not an unusual situation; it is a chronic condition in lay
decisionmaking on subjects as to which expertise is relevant, but
experts disagree. The lay decisionmaker knows that the majority of
experts might be wrong, but placing one’s epistemic bets with the
majority is still better than placing them with the minority. Implicit
nose counting thus goes on all the time. When a patient gets a second
opinion that disagrees with the first, a common recourse is to seek a
third opinion to break the tie. Captains of the age of sail would bring
three compasses to sea; in case the readings given by the first two
58
conflicted, the third would be consulted. And judicial opinions
themselves constantly refer, in an untheorized way, to the views of “a
majority of experts” or “a majority of studies” to buttress their factual
59
claims.

[conclusion].”); Adkins v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 958 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir.
1992) (“[T]he ALJ must give some reasoned explanation why [the expert’s] superior
qualifications do not carry the day.”).
58. I thank Jon Elster for making this point to me.
59. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 138 n.9 (1994) (“majority of
studies”); John M. v. Stone, 72 F. Supp. 2d 316, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“majority of experts”);
United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877, 892 (D.N.M. 1995) (“majority of experts”).
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Indeed, implicit nose counting also underpins the common but
untheorized agency practice in which agencies appeal to expert
consensus as a sufficient reason for taking facts as established. Such
an appeal effectively says that the unanimous view of experts is
sufficient reason to take a fact or causal theory as established; this is
just as much a case of nose counting as an appeal to a majority view
of experts. But if first-order reasons were the only permissible
reasons, the difference between unanimity and majority should make
no difference. The logic of cases like Stalcup is that administrative
decisionmakers should not be able to appeal to expert consensus
either—they should have to disgorge their first-order judgments,
whether or not the experts have achieved consensus—but this is
preposterous.
D. Nose Counting in Regulatory Rulemaking
The black lung cases involve administration of a benefits scheme.
In marked contrast to those cases, in which nose counting is said to be
impermissible, nose counting by both agencies and reviewing courts is
ubiquitous in regulatory rulemaking. The practice, however, is almost
wholly untheorized.
60
In American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit reviewed
EPA’s 1997 revision of the NAAQS for ozone and particulate matter.
In an initial round of litigation, the D.C. Circuit had invalidated the
rulemaking on constitutional nondelegation grounds, only to be
61
reversed by the Supreme Court. On remand, the D.C. Circuit upheld
the rules under standard arbitrariness review. Notably, EPA had
justified its choices not only by first-order reasons, but also by nose
counting. One key feature of the rules, EPA pointed out, was within a
62
range thought desirable by “most CASAC . . . members.” As to
another key feature, “EPA . . . emphasized that CASAC unanimously
63
agreed with the proposed change.” The court followed suit,
upholding the EPA’s decisions in part because the court thought that
the agency’s nose counting was a perfectly sound sort of reason for
the agency to give. As to one issue, the court specifically cited EPA’s
appeal to CASAC consensus, calling it “record evidence” that helped

60. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
61. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999), rev’d sub nom. Whitman
v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
62. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 283 F.3d at 367.
63. Id. at 376.
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the agency meet its burden of reasoned fact-finding and
64
decisionmaking. As to another issue, on which CASAC did not
reach consensus, the court noted that EPA had followed the majority
65
view.
The opinion on remand in American Trucking is eminently
sensible, and it exemplifies an epistemic strategy that is routine for
agencies and courts. Current administrative law is inconsistent about
whether nose counting is an adequate basis for fact-finding for
purposes of APA review, with the black lung cases saying that it is not
and cases like American Trucking suggesting that it is. I believe the
second view is generally correct.
III. WHEN NOSE COUNTING IS INADEQUATE
Despite these points, and compatible with them, it is also true
that nose counting is inadequate under a narrow set of identifiable
conditions, and should be ruled out as a valid basis for agency factfinding and decisionmaking. I will identify two such conditions: when
nose counting would create incentives for costly strategic behavior by
litigants or agencies, and when there is a demonstrable risk of biased
decisionmaking or harmful groupthink on expert panels. Let us
discuss these in turn.
A. Endogenous Panels and Strategic Behavior
The Stalcup court offered the valid concern that nose counting
“would promote a quantity-over-quality approach to expert retention,
requiring parties to engage in a race to hire experts to insure
66
victory.” Where the very size of the panel is itself a variable that the
parties or the agency can choose, and can choose during litigation or
in the shadow of litigation, then the number of noses to be counted is
endogenous. In the worst version, parties or agencies will add experts
after seeing what earlier experts have said, in order to generate a
desired result.
Such concerns, however, need not entail that nose counting is
altogether impermissible. In many, perhaps most, cases of agency
nose counting, the panel’s number and composition is set or
constrained by statute, agency rule, or policy well before agencies

64. Id. at 378.
65. Id. at 379.
66. Stalcup v. Peabody Coal Co., 477 F.3d 482, 484 (7th Cir. 2007).
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have found relevant facts in support of a proposed rule or order, and
before litigation ensues. Under standard principles of administrative
law, an agency directive creating a panel is binding upon the agency
67
unless and until changed through proper procedures. And, as a
backup safeguard, courts can apply greater scrutiny to panels whose
number or composition the agency has determined after litigation has
68
commenced. In such cases, the scope for strategic behavior is small
or nonexistent; the panel can safely be treated by reviewing courts as
entirely exogenous.
What makes the problem a real one in the black lung setting, and
in other settings in which agencies award statutory benefits or impose
statutory penalties conditioned on adjudicative facts, is that the
parties themselves hire experts after seeing what the other side’s
experts have said, or what their own experts have said, and after
seeing how many experts the other side has hired. In such settings,
rational parties will invest in hiring additional experts up to the point
at which the marginal increase in the expected payoff equals the
marginal cost of hiring the next expert. There is also a serious risk
that later experts will simply free-ride on the conclusion of earlier
experts, as I will discuss shortly.
Here too, however, making nose counting impermissible is
unnecessary. The simpler approach is to require parties to use a
standard operating procedure, familiar from arbitration, in which the
number of experts is determined in advance, behind a veil of
ignorance about what the experts will say. Whether agency
adjudicators or reviewing courts have the authority to do this will of
course depend upon the details of the statutory scheme, but there is
no objection in principle. Here the core problem is not with nose
counting as such, but with strategic behavior. The problem can be
attacked on its own terms, without an overbroad prohibition on an
epistemically sensible strategy of second-order reasoning.
Moreover, the Stalcup court’s concern about strategic behavior,
however valid in itself, just identifies a collateral systemic cost that
can arise from nose counting. It is a separate question whether that
cost outweighs the epistemic benefits. A system or practice with both

67. See Ariz. Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 370, 389–90
(1932).
68. Cf. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50
(1983); NLRB v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438, 444 (1965); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
194, 196 (1947).
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nose counting and some degree of strategic behavior may be superior
overall to a system or practice with neither feature. If the agency has
a reason for thinking that the benefits outweigh the costs, that reason
is itself subject to the APA’s usual standards of review, and courts
should uphold it so long as it is nonarbitrary.
Finally, I speculate, without hard evidence, that nose counting is
impossible to eliminate altogether. Agencies or agency adjudicators
who are basically at sea—who rationally lack any confidence in their
own first-order judgments, for example, the sort of medical judgments
that the Stalcup court oddly required agency adjudicators to give—
may implicitly count noses for lack of a better alternative, as indeed
judges sometimes do as well. In such cases, making nose counting
impermissible will simply drive agencies to conceal the real bases for
their fact-finding. Nose counting is a ubiquitous epistemic strategy,
both in ordinary life and in official decisionmaking, and
administrative law has no real choice but to accommodate it.
B. Judgment Falsification and Groupthink
Part of the judicial concern about nose counting may rest on an
intuitive concern about false consensus, herding, or groupthink by
experts. In a Jury Theorem framework, the concern is that a group of
experts in a given field will have highly correlated biases, because of
common professional training, because they copy each other’s
opinions, or even because the expert panel fakes an appearance of
consensus for public consumption; in the last case, experts will not be
voting sincerely, which undermines the operation of the Theorem.
Common professional training is a built-in hazard of expert
panels drawn from a scientific field or subfield. Copying may occur
because of an “information cascade,” in which individual experts
rationally use the views of other experts as the basis for forming their
own views, thus reducing the number of independent opinions
expressed by the group overall. Here there is a kind of epistemic free69
70
riding or “cognitive loafing,” as some within the group benefit from
the information provided by other’s views without contributing
information themselves. Copying may also occur because of a

69. See List & Pettit, supra note 51, at 138–40.
70. Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 486 (2002).
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“reputational cascade,” in which experts follow the views of senior
scientists or powerful figures in the field, for fear of being stamped as
incompetent or odd.
As to the falsification of expert judgments, case studies have
shown that expert panels sometimes gin up a consensus that does not
72
actually exist. The panel may do this in order to maximize its
members’ joint influence on agencies and other decisionmakers, or
out of paternalistic concern that the agency or public will become
confused if the panel ventilates its disputes, or because the panel’s
members have a professional interest in preserving a public
73
reputation for expertise. When this occurs, some panel members are
falsifying their judgments, and the panel as a whole conceals
information—about the presence and magnitude of expert
disagreement—that is useful for decisionmakers.
C. The Conditions for Expert Groupthink
Whether such concerns are serious depends upon the
composition, structure, and decisionmaking process of the expert
panel. What factors make groupthink or judgment falsification more
or less likely? I will use groupthink, itself an ill-defined notion, as
shorthand for the various forms of epistemic free-riding,
informational and reputational cascades, and falsification of
judgments I have mentioned. Although the problems are somewhat
different, the institutional determinants of the various types of
groupthink overlap a great deal.
First, groupthink is less likely to occur as the diversity of panel
74
membership increases. Many panels are chosen uniformly from
specialists in relevant scientific subfields, like the panel of scientists in
75
Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Daley. In other cases, statutes
require that expert panels contain professionals from different fields,
76
or even nonprofessionals, and these can be understood as means for
diversifying the panel’s training, assumptions, and intellectual
71. Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN.
L. REV. 683, 685–89, 727–28 (1999).
72. John Beatty, Masking Disagreement Among Experts, 3 EPISTEME 52, 55 (2006).
73. Id. at 53–54. See generally Bauke Visser & Otto H. Swank, On Committees of Experts,
122 Q.J. ECON. 337 (2007) (showing conditions under which a panel of experts concerned for
their individual reputations will generate false consensus).
74. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 141–44 (2003).
75. Or. Natural Res. Council v. Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1146 (D. Or. 1998).
76. See infra notes 116–120 and accompanying text.
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outlook. In Jury Theorem terms, this approach trades off reduced
average competence, because diversification requires that some
specialists in the subfield must be bumped off a panel of fixed size, for
reduced correlation of biases across the group. Depending upon the
precise composition, the benefits of reduced correlation can more
than compensate for the loss, in which case some degree of
77
diversification will be epistemically optimal. I return to these issues
shortly.
Another major cause of groupthink is sequential, rather than
simultaneous, expression of views among the panel experts. If experts
express their judgments in ignorance of other experts’ judgments,
herding and cascades are ruled out, although false consensus arising
78
from experts’ concern for reputation is still possible. Ideally, experts
should vote simultaneously rather than sequentially, in order to
prevent informational and reputational cascades. In real-world
conditions, however, simultaneity is difficult to achieve; deliberation
prior to voting will give experts a sense of where other experts stand.
These tensions are on display in a set of guidelines issued by the Food
79
and Drug Administration for its many expert advisory committees.
On the one hand, the guidelines expressly recommend simultaneous
voting, citing the academic literature on the risks of information
80
cascades. On the other hand, the guidelines recommend extensive
deliberation before voting, and recommend against the use of secret
81
ballots, which can help block reputational cascades by preventing
panel members from knowing how others voted.
The structure of experts’ compensation is also important. If
experts receive no compensation or merely nominal compensation, as
is the case with many scientific panels, then the incentives for

77. Krishna K. Ladha, The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech, and Correlated Votes, 36
AM. J. POL. SCI. 617, 629 (1992).
78. For a model in which expert panels, voting simultaneously, nonetheless generate false
consensus, see Visser & Swank, supra note 73. The basic mechanism in the model is that experts
believe that the audience believes that competent experts will all have the same view of the
facts, in which case disagreement among the panel implies that some of its members are less
competent. On further assumptions, this causes the minority to go along with the majority even
if the minority disagrees. This mechanism is unaffected by the simultaneity of voting.
79. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE
FOR FDA ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND FDA STAFF: VOTING PROCEDURES FOR
ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETINGS (2008), available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/advisory/
GuidancePolicyRegs/ACVotingFINALGuidance080408.pdf.
80. Id. at 5 n.1.
81. Id. at 4.
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epistemic free-riding or cognitive loafing are at a maximum,
increasing the risks of herding within the panel. Even if experts are
rewarded for their own performance, information cascades are still a
risk, because in an information cascade, it is individually rational to
follow the views of a sufficient number of others, even if one’s private
82
83
information is to the contrary. Both theory and experiments
suggest that the best way to prevent information cascades from
forming is to reward individuals on the basis of the accuracy of a
majority vote within the group, rather than for individual accuracy.
Under this reward structure, the individual’s incentive is to reveal
private information to the group, maximizing the chance that (a
majority of) the group as a whole will make the correct decision.
All this said, however, the groupthink concern does not show
that nose counting is necessarily an impermissible epistemic strategy
for agencies. What it shows is that agencies and reviewing courts will
sometimes have valid second-order, epistemic reasons for discounting
the views of an expert consensus or an expert majority. I turn to such
cases in Part IV. In other cases, however, such concerns are not
implicated; or, if they are implicated, the agency may still rationally
decide that nose counting is a better epistemic strategy than the
available alternatives. Where either of these conditions is met, there
is nothing wrong with nose counting of experts by agencies.
D. Conclusion
I conclude that a factual finding based upon nose counting of
experts should count as an adequately reasoned decision, absent
special reason for second-order concern about strategic behavior,
judgment falsification, or expert groupthink. When those conditions
do not hold, nose counting is a valid basis for decision within the
84
terms of the APA. The court’s basic error in cases like Stalcup is to
think that first-order reasons—the administrative law judge’s medical
conclusions, issued in the face of expert disagreement—are the only

82. Vladislav Kargin, Prevention of Herding by Experts, 78 ECON. LETTERS 401, 402
(2003).
83. Angela A. Hung & Charles R. Plott, Information Cascades: Replication and an
Extension to Majority Rule and Conformity-Rewarding Institutions, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1508,
1509 (2001).
84. Cf. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 464–65 (1972)
(“[W]ell-reasoned expert testimony—based on what is known and uncontradicted by empirical
evidence—may in and of itself be ‘substantial evidence’ when first-hand evidence on the
question . . . is unavailable.”).
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sort of reasons that administrative law can recognize. Nothing in the
Act, in the conceptual framework of administrative law, or in the
theory of rational decisionmaking requires this exclusion of secondorder reasons. Nose counting of experts is a ubiquitous second-order
strategy for lay decisionmakers; although it is not the only such
strategy, there is often no alternative. To force lay decisionmakers, in
such cases, to arbitrate an expert disagreement by coughing up a firstorder reason for which they lack any epistemic foundation is itself a
guarantee of unreasoned decisionmaking.
IV. WHEN AGENCIES MUST COUNT NOSES
So far we have discussed cases in which agencies use nose
counting as a reason for their decisions, and courts review whether
the reason is adequate. By contrast, there are also important cases in
which agencies wish to depart from the majority or supermajority
view of an expert panel, as to matters of fact, causation, or prediction.
Should they be allowed to do so? Under what conditions, and based
on what reasons?
A. An Example: Fine Particulate Matter
A well-known example of this problem, during the Bush
administration, was EPA’s 2006 decision to reject the CASAC
recommendations about the revision of the NAAQS for fine
85
particulate matter. CASAC, following a 20 to 2 vote of its subpanel
on particulate matter, recommended an annual standard between
twelve and fourteen micrograms per cubic meter, but EPA rejected
the recommendation and maintained the extant annual standard of
fifteen micrograms. This was the first time that EPA had ever directly
rejected a CASAC recommendation in the NAAQS revision process.
A section of the CAA obligates an administrator to explain why
proposed rules “differ[] in any important respect from any
86
of . . . [CASAC’s] recommendations.” The administrator explained
the EPA’s 2006 rejection on several grounds: (1) the agency’s choice

85. The 2006 NAAQS regulations that resulted were successfully challenged, so far as
relevant here, in the D.C. Circuit by a coalition of state attorneys general and health and
environmental groups. See Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, No. 06-1410, 2009 WL 437050, at
*6 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 24, 2009) (per curiam) (overturning the EPA’s decision as to the annual
standard for fine particulate matter on the ground that EPA failed to adequately explain its
decision).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(3) (2006).
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was based on its own view of “the most directly relevant body of
87
scientific studies,” (2) CASAC saw less scientific uncertainty than
88
the Administrator thought was actually present, and (3) the CASAC
recommendation was not unanimous, because two of twenty-two
89
members of the particulate matter panel dissented. Compressing
these grounds somewhat, we may understand the administrator as
giving two types of reasons for departing from CASAC’s findings and
recommendation: (1) first-order scientific reasons based on the
agency’s own expertise—in this case its expert assessment of the best
available science, and of the level of scientific uncertainty—and (2)
the second-order reason, offered to diminish the epistemic force of
the panel’s conclusions—that the panel was not unanimous, implying
that reasonable experts could disagree.
I will suggest that neither type of reason was sufficient to justify
rejecting the panel’s factual findings. The former is just the
90
administrator’s first-order view, and has no special epistemic status;
the latter is, in these circumstances, an invalid second-order
argument. Lacking any valid reason for departing from the panel’s
findings, the administrator violated the CAA. In order to prevail, the
administrator would have had to either give a valid second-order
reason for rejecting the panel’s factual findings, or else show that the
agency’s regulatory priorities or evaluation of alternative policies
were an adequate basis for disagreement. In the latter case, the
administrator would have had to make transparent EPA’s normative
differences with the panel, making it easier for Congress, the courts,
and the public to monitor the agency’s commitments and behavior.
As it turned out, the D.C. Circuit recently overturned the
administrator’s decision as to the annual standard for fine particulate
matter, finding that the administrator “failed adequately to explain its
91
reason for not accepting the CASAC’s recommendations.” The
court’s analytic framework was somewhat different than the one I

87. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 71 Fed. Reg. 61,144,
61,174 (Oct. 17, 2006) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 50.6 (2008)).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 61, 174 n.44.
90. Again, the administrator’s superior democratic credentials might entitle him to
evaluate alternative policies within the bounds Congress has set out, but they are no basis for
according his judgments of fact, causation, or prediction superior status to those of (other)
experts. My discussion is confined to the latter point.
91. Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, No. 06-1410, 2009 WL 437050, at *7 (D.C. Cir. Feb.
24, 2009) (per curiam).
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suggest because the court said that the administrator’s technical
92
expertise deserves deference, but in practice the court seemed to
93
weigh the technical expertise of CASAC more heavily, consistent
with the analysis here.
B. Expert Disagreement and First-Order Reasons
Contrary to current law, I suggest that the administrator’s firstorder view of the scientific merits should have no special weight as
against a panel’s factual findings. Administrators are experts, at least
in the sense that their views are typically informed by the expertise of
staff scientists (although as we will see, this is not always true, and
was not true in the particulate matter rulemaking). But the members
of the scientific panel are expert as well. The administrator’s view
should thus be understood to count as just another vote among
others. If the expert panel is tied, it follows that the agency’s vote is
decisive and the agency can choose either view, as the court held in
Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Daley. If, however, a decisive
majority of experts favors a certain view, then the administrator’s
contrary view is simply another vote for the dissenting side, and as
94
such is defeated.
This approach is entirely consistent with believing—if anyone
does believe this—that the administrator is the single most competent
expert in the picture. A main point of the Jury Theorem is that a
group of somewhat less expert voters, so long as their competence is
better than random, can be markedly superior to a single expert of
higher competence. Indeed, under identifiable conditions, the
accuracy of the group’s median or mean member will necessarily
95
exceed that of its single most competent member.
The agency can, of course, hear what the panel has to say, review
its methods and conclusions, and then form its own judgments. This
92. See id. at *14. As I explain below, my suggestion is not that the administrator lacks
expertise, but that the administrator should be understood to have only one vote in the
parliament of the experts.
93. See id. slip op. at *7–*10 (noting disagreements between CASAC and EPA, and finding
that EPA had not adequately explained why its judgments should trump those of CASAC).
94. This approach creates a discontinuity: where the expert panel is tied the administrator
necessarily prevails, but not otherwise, so the switch of a small number of votes on the panel can
in theory be dispositive for the outcome. This is, however, a standard property of majority
rule—under May’s Theorem, it is one of the conditions that majority rule can alone satisfy
jointly—and it is a routine property of majority voting in legislatures.
95. SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES
BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES 158 (2007).
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does not show that the agency’s conclusions can incorporate all of the
panel’s expertise, and add to it the agency’s own. To see this, imagine
that the administrator is placed on the panel; some statutory panels,
set up to advise a given agency, do include the heads of other agencies
or government officials. In such circumstances, the administrator
could likewise consider the information available to other panel
members, but the administrator would merely have one vote among
others, and a contrary majority view of experts would trump that
vote. I suggest that the same logic holds when statutes require the
administrator to consider the panel’s factual findings and to give a
reason for departing from them. In such cases, the agency’s own firstorder view of the facts should not suffice to trump the panel’s
aggregate expertise.
C. Ex Ante Incentives
In principle, it is possible that members of expert panels might
invest less in acquiring information when, and because, agencies defer
to them on factual questions. If the agency must accept the panel’s
work, the panel might do it less carefully. Yet the opposite effect
seems at least equally possible: expert panels who know they will
receive no deference have little incentive to get things right, whereas
expert panels may invest more time in acquiring information precisely
when, and because, they know that the agency is presumptively
obliged to accept their findings. Requiring agency deference to panel
96
findings, in other words, eliminates a kind of epistemic moral hazard
that can arise when the panel is aware that the agency is likely to
ignore its work. In light of this point, the ex ante incentives of the
framework suggested here are ambiguous and unclear; at a minimum,
there is no ground for concern that the framework will systematically
undermine expert panels’ incentives to acquire information.
D. Disaggregating Agencies
This analysis assumes that it is best to treat the agency head as an
97
expert, whose view is to count for one but also for no more than one.

96. Cf. ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON 95–96 (2009) (“Legislators
who anticipate constitutional judicial review may rationally invest less in gathering and
processing information . . . . Precisely because they know that judges will be trying to catch their
mistakes, they may commit more mistakes.”).
97. Some agencies have multi-member heads; an example is the five-member Federal
Communications Commission. The logic of my suggestion is that each member would count for
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I do not, however, defend the very different claim that reviewing
courts should ignore internal expert staff who make
recommendations to the agency head. Under the Universal Camera
approach, the findings of internal experts, such as agency technical
98
staff, are themselves part of the record. By parallel, the view of
internal expert staff should be taken to be part of a larger, albeit
virtual, expert panel composed of both outside expert advisory panels
and career experts internal to the agency—the full parliament of
experts.
This yields several possible cases. In the easiest case, expert staff
within the agency take the same view as outside expert panels, and
both are opposed by the agency head, who is a political appointee.
During EPA’s 2006 revisions of the fine particulate matter standards,
the agency’s expert staff made findings in accord with CASAC’s
99
findings, and the administrator rejected both. Here, adding the votes
of the internal experts to those of the expert advisory panel would, at
most, increase the size of the expert supermajority opposing the
agency’s view. That view would be overridden anyway under the
approach I have suggested, unless the agency has a valid second-order
reason for thinking that the expert panel’s conclusions were
epistemically informed. Including internal agency staff in the
parliament of experts makes no difference in such cases.
There are two harder cases, however. In the first hard case, the
internal experts support an agency’s view, and both are contradicted
by an outside expert panel. Suppose that an expert panel composed of
ten members splits, 6 to 4, in favor of a certain finding of fact.
Suppose also that the agency head, considering the views of three
internal experts, believes the finding is incorrect. Is the count 6 to 5 in
favor of the finding, because the agency counts for one? Or is it 8 to 6
against the finding, because one must count not only the agency’s own
vote, but also the votes of the three internal experts? In the second
hard case, an agency view is supported by a majority of the outside

one vote in the parliament of experts. Because outside expert panels rarely split by such small
margins, this is unlikely to make a difference in many real cases.
98. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 967–70 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(per curiam) (treating an internal staff paper as relevant to judging the adequacy of the agency’s
decisionmaking), vacated in part, 921 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
99. Final Opening Brief of State Petitioners and State Amici at 7–8, Am. Farm Bureau
Fed’n v. EPA, No. 06-1410, 2009 WL 437050 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 7, 2008) (per curiam), 2008 WL
2609199.
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expert panel, but counting the votes of internal expert staff separately
would tip the overall count of expert votes against the agency.
The approach I suggest implies that the views of expert staff
should be counted in both of these hard cases. Career experts within
the agency are at least partly insulated from political interference by
civil service protections, thick but informal norms of professional
100
autonomy, and mission orientation.
As a result, they not
infrequently make findings that politically appointed agency heads
override or ignore, as occurred in the particulate matter controversy.
Whether they support or oppose the findings of the agency head, the
expert views of internal staff provide epistemically valuable
information that reviewing courts can and should take into account,
without large increases in the costs of judicial decisionmaking.
A cost of this approach is that it might give agencies tactical
incentives to hire more internal experts, in the hope of swamping
expert advisory panels by sheer weight of numbers. This is a selflimiting problem, however, and thus not a major concern. Hiring
internal staff experts is costly business, given the civil service
protections and general red tape surrounding federal employment,
and the agency will anticipate that it will be saddled with the internal
experts even after the particular rulemaking or adjudication at issue is
long since past.
E. Facts, Policymaking, and Statutory Authority
The approach I suggest is consistent with the undisputed truth
that the administrator, not CASAC, is charged by statute with finding
101
facts and with ultimate legal responsibility for the decision. The
problem is to reconcile that authority with the statutory command
that the agency must give adequate reasons for rejecting CASAC’s
findings and recommendations. In the framework I have set out, these
provisions are best understood as entrusting the agency with legal
responsibility for making the ultimate decision, based in turn on the
best available judgments of fact. They entrust the agency with the
evaluation of alternative policies, and with deciding what the agency
will do given some determination of the state of the world, but they
provide no reason to privilege the agency’s unilateral determination
100. Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in
Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1064 n.43 (1995) (“[T]he
permanent staff of agencies are often resistant to the policy agenda of political appointments.”).
101. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408–09 (2006).
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of facts, when the agency’s reasons for rejecting expert conclusions
are inadequate. The agency is entitled to decide what to do, and can
always reject a panel’s recommendation on the grounds that the
agency evaluates possible policies differently than does the panel, or
that the agency wishes to allocate resources differently. The agency,
however, is not entitled to make determinations of fact, causation, or
prediction that depart from the best epistemic indicator of the truth
of those matters—the expert panel’s view—absent some second-order
reason to think that the epistemic quality of that view was
compromised.
In Universal Camera, likewise, the Court noted that the agency
had been charged with fact-finding and decisionmaking authority, but
nonetheless held that on an appropriate record the expert factfinder’s
conclusions could trump that of the agency. Accordingly it reversed
the lower court, which had said that the grant of fact-finding and
decisionmaking authority to the agency meant that the agency’s
findings must prevail over those of a hearing examiner. A main point
of Universal Camera is that a statutory grant of fact-finding authority
to the agency does not immunize the agency’s factual conclusions
when expert factfinders disagree.
That said, the approach I suggest is squarely inconsistent with the
broad principle that, “in the event of a scientific disagreement
between experts, the [agency] is free to rely on the expert opinion of
102
[its] choice.” This principle is too broad; taken literally, it would
allow the agency to rely on the view of even a single dissenting expert,
as against the otherwise unanimous view of the whole scientific
community. The principle does apply sensibly in cases like Oregon
Natural Resources Council v. Daley, in which an expert body splits
down the middle. When that is so, there is no alternative to letting the
agency break the tie. When, however, an expert panel divides into a
majority or supermajority and a minority of dissenters, the logic of
tiebreaking no longer applies.
F. An Interpretive Default Rule
Congress could of course specify, in the organic statute or
elsewhere, that the agency’s first-order view of the facts will prevail in
the event of a disagreement with a panel consensus or a panel
majority; if so, then those first-order views would count as legally

102. Or. Natural Res. Council v. Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1159 (D. Or. 1998).
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sufficient reasons. Congress has not legislated so specifically,
however. In the case of the CAA, Congress simply said that the EPA
Administrator must supply “an explanation of the reasons for such
differences [between CASAC findings or recommendations and
103
EPA’s final rules]”; so too with the secretary of HHS, who is
obliged by statute to give a reason for rejecting a recommendation of
the Advisory Committee on Childhood Vaccines (ACCV). It is an
open question what sort of reasons such provisions should be
understood to require.
Absent more specific direction from Congress, should these
provisions and others like them be interpreted to require first-order
reasons—substantive views about the matters of fact, causation, and
prediction on which CASAC offers its opinions? Or should they be
interpreted to require second-order reasons about the relative
epistemic quality of the agency’s views and CASAC’s? As an
interpretive default rule, I suggest that, unless Congress clearly does
specify otherwise, such provisions should be read to require the
agency to give a valid second-order reason for departing from the
factual findings of a scientific or technical advisory panel. The best
epistemic practice is thus to treat the agency’s first-order reasons as
just another vote that is outweighed by a contrary body of expert
votes on factual matters. The only type of reason that suffices is a
reason to think that, epistemically, the agency is better positioned
than a (super)majority of the panel to get the facts right. Although
such a showing is possible—I canvass some valid second-order
reasons that agencies might be able to offer and substantiate in
particular cases—it will usually be difficult.
Nothing in this argument, however, suggests that agencies must
defer to the panel’s evaluation of possible policies, given certain facts.
As we have seen, courts allow agencies to set regulatory priorities and
allocate resources, even in the face of panel recommendations to the
104
contrary. The logic of that restriction is that agencies may evaluate
possible policies in light of their own preferences, rather than the
panel’s, insofar as the law permits. A statutory duty to give reasons
105
for rejecting a panel’s findings and recommendations, then, is best
103. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(3) (2006).
104. See Int’l Union, UAW v. Chao, 361 F.3d 249, 256 (3d Cir. 2004) (allowing the agency to
reject an advisory committee recommendation on the ground that the agency had rationally set
other priorities).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(3). The CAA obligies the Administrator to explain any differences
between the adopted policies and CASAC’s “findings” or “recommendations.” Id.
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understood as two very different duties with different consequences.
As to findings, agencies must adopt the factual bases of a panel’s
conclusions absent some valid second-order reason for rejecting
them. By contrast, the agency need not adopt the panel’s overall
recommendations for policies if agencies have a standard first-order
reason for evaluating competing policies differently or for setting
different regulatory priorities. Yet even in such cases, the agency will
be forced to openly state its evaluative differences with the panel or
its different regulatory priorities, thereby reducing the costs of
monitoring to reviewing courts and democratic bodies.
Under ordinary canons of statutory interpretation, I suggest, an
approach of this sort makes the best sense overall of the ambiguous
relationship between the agency that Congress established and the
expert panel that Congress also established. A puzzle arises when the
statute itself, as well as background principles of administrative law,
make the agency responsible for the decision, yet the statute also
gives the panel ability to make recommendations as well as factual
106
findings. In the case of the CAA, for example, there is some tension
between Congress’s decisions both to make the agency responsible
for the ultimate decision and also to specify that EPA must explain its
reasons for differing from the panel’s findings and recommendations.
The most sensible reconciliation, in light of general background
principles of administrative law, is that Congress saw the scientific
panel as occupying the best epistemic position to make judgments
about questions of fact, leaving to EPA the important responsibility
of evaluating alternative policies in light of those factual judgments.
107
The same holds for the ACCV and the secretary of HHS.
This is a point about the best interpretation of the agency’s
organic statute, but it also helps to make sense of relevant APA

106. Thanks to Jonathan Wiener for emphasizing the latter point.
107. In other cases, the organic statute merely creates a scientific or technical advisory
committee, but does not in terms require an explanation for differing from its
recommendations. See Holland-Rantos Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 587 F.2d
1173, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (“The recommendations of the NAS-NRC panels are
advisory in nature.”). Even in such cases, however, the statutory mandate, and the purpose
behind it, are most naturally read together to implicitly require that the agency give a valid
second-order epistemic reason for departing from the panel’s view. See id. at 1175–76
(commenting that, although the FDA’s “cavalier and unexplained rejection of the opinion of its
expert panel strains a ‘cornerstone requirement’ of the administrative process, that of ‘reasoned
decision making,’” a remand would be “arid formalism” under the circumstances, because
subsequent evidence made it clear that the agency’s decision was correct (quoting Columbia
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 454 F.2d 1018, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 1971))).
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standards and their interaction with the organic statutes. The APA’s
background obligation of reasoned fact-finding and decisionmaking is
best understood to require that the agency either defer to the expert
panel as to factual matters or else give a reason to think that it, rather
than the expert panel, is in the best epistemic position to determine
relevant facts. This was the implicit logic of Universal Camera, in
which the Court said that reviewing judges could look behind agency
findings to consider whether the agency had given adequate reason
for refusing to credit the contrary findings of a specialized hearing
108
examiner. The Court’s discussion, as amplified and clarified by
Learned Hand and Jerome Frank in opinions on remand, suggests
that examiners are usually best situated to determine witness
credibility and demeanor, and that to reject their findings, the agency
must give a reason that “results from the [agency’s] rational use of the
109
[agency’s] specialized knowledge.” The agency, in other words,
must show that its epistemic competence is greater, on average, than
the expert factfinder’s epistemic competence, as to the relevant class
of questions.
G. Fact-Finding and Second-Order Reasons
On this approach, the key issue, and the key holding of Universal
Camera, involves comparative epistemic competence: whether the
agency or expert is best positioned to determine relevant facts, where
reviewing courts who lack direct knowledge themselves should place
their epistemic bets, and, more generally, how fact-finding authority
should be allocated between agencies and their expert advisors.
Agencies are not always obliged to find facts in accordance with the
expert panel’s view. Rather, agencies should be allowed to reject
panel findings if they substantiate the right sort of second-order
reason.
In general, valid second-order reasons will give reviewing courts
confidence that the best epistemic bet is to rely on the agency’s firstorder views rather than those of the expert panel. Agencies should be
able to reject panel findings only if they can give concrete reason to
think that the epistemic quality of the expert panel’s conclusions are
low, relative to the agency’s own views. It follows that valid reasons

108. NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429, 432 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J.,
concurring).
109. Id.
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will just be the flipside of the permissible epistemic strategies
discussed in Parts II and III.
H. Track Records
In some cases, agencies will have information about the accuracy
of an expert panel’s past factual estimates, the causal theories it
advanced, or its past predictions. When this is so, agencies might be
able to show that the panel has often erred. This is likely to be a rare
case, however, and courts should be wary of this sort of second-order
claim for several reasons.
Mere inaccuracy does not show that a past panel’s conclusions
were epistemically flawed or that the agency’s own first-order views
are likely to be systematically superior. Because factual
determinations, causal theories, and predictions of any complexity
will inevitably have a “stochastic” element—an element of irreducible
randomness, arising from the costs of information or built into the
nature of things—it is perfectly possible that the panel’s conclusions
are systematically superior to the agency’s, from an ex ante
perspective, even if the panel’s conclusions have sometimes turned
out to be wrong. Furthermore, panels whose members serve for long
110
periods may develop “endogenous expertise” through experience
and institutional learning over time. In such cases, the panel’s initial
findings and predictions may be flawed, but their quality will
systematically improve over time. From the standpoint of the
reviewing court, the best epistemic bet overall may still be to trust the
conclusions of the expert panel over the agency’s views.
These points imply that a high rate of turnover among panel
members may make it difficult to gauge the track record of the panel.
Indeed, as turnover increases, “the panel” becomes an increasingly
ill-defined entity. Reviewing courts could plausibly, and without much
difficulty, discount the validity of an agency’s appeal to the panel’s
track record by the rate at which panel membership has changed over
time. Such a practice would reduce, at the margin, agency incentives
to manipulate the composition of expert panels by substituting new
111
members whose viewpoints will predictably track the agency’s own.

110. Cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, Bureaucratic Decision Costs and Endogenous Agency
Expertise, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 469, 472 (2007).
111. In the 1980s, EPA was accused of manipulating the membership of its Science Advisory
Board in this way. A Reagan administration “hit list” was discovered containing the names of
advisors whose views were no longer sympathetic to that of the administration. Most of the
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By doing so, the agency would also be undercutting its own ability to
appeal to the panel’s track record as a basis for departing from its
views.
I.

Comparative Qualifications

In some cases, agencies will have valid reason to reject nose
counting—to decline to follow a (super)majority view of the panel—
because the agency validly weights votes by the qualifications of the
voters. In the black lung cases it is perfectly rational for the agency
adjudicator to believe the diagnoses of two doctors with special
qualifications in detecting pneumoconiosis over the diagnoses of
three general practitioners. Counting weighted votes is an epistemic
improvement, so long as the weights track competence and—a crucial
qualification—so long as the discounted voters bring no cognitive
diversity to the group. If the latter condition does not hold because
the discounted voters bring new perspectives or have views that, by
training or profession, are likely to be uncorrelated with the views of
highly competent experts, then the logic of the Jury Theorem suggests
that the group’s overall epistemic performance will be better than the
112
views of even its most expert members.
J.

Bias

In other cases, agencies might be able to point to systematic bias
among members of the panel in order to impeach the epistemic
warrant for their conclusions. If statutes create a panel composed, for
example, largely of experts drawn from a certain discipline,
profession, or industry, and if the panel’s recommendations track
apparent disciplinary or professional biases or industry interests,
there is valid ground for concern. In National Nutritional Foods Ass’n
113
v. Califano, the Second Circuit heard a challenge to the composition
of an advisory committee charged with making recommendations
about whether consumer warnings should be placed on packaged
dietary supplements. Although the challenge was dismissed on
procedural grounds not relevant here, the court noted that the panel
was composed solely of physicians, that the physicians were
scientists on the list were, indeed, “retired” by the Reagan EPA. Nicholas A. Ashford, Advisory
Committees in OSHA and EPA: Their Use in Regulatory Decisionmaking, 9 SCI. TECH. & HUM.
VALUES 72, 72 n.1, 77 n.16 (1984).
112. Ladha, supra note 77, at 619.
113. Nat’l Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. Califano, 603 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1979).
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“understandably leaning in favor of medical supervision of [the
114
underlying substances],” and that the panel’s skewed composition
“directly implicates the concern Congress addressed in [the Federal
Advisory Committee Act], that agency action might be dominated by
115
one particular viewpoint.” By analogy, the same concerns suggest
that agencies will have better second-order reason to depart from
panel recommendations when the panel’s composition is narrowly
defined or drawn predominantly from industry.
Here there are two relevant interpretations of the vague term
“bias”: motivational and epistemic. In the former sense, bias means
that the expert is not even trying to reach the right answer, as
opposed to the answer that benefits the expert’s firm or career; in the
latter sense, bias means that the expert has blind spots arising
precisely from specialized training or knowledge. In Jury Theorem
terms, bias may thus be understood either as a simple violation of the
condition of sincere voting, at the level of individuals, or else as a
concern about the positive correlation of errors across the group. If
members of a scientific subdiscipline, profession, or industry have
highly correlated perspectives, it is less likely that errors will wash out
at the group level.
In many cases, however, the underlying statutes require a mix of
professions, disciplines, and perspectives, specifying with particularity
how the panel should be composed. Under the CAA, for example,
CASAC comprises “at least one member of the National Academy of
Sciences, one physician, and one person representing State air
116
pollution control agencies.” Likewise, the ACCV is comprised of
health experts, members of the general public (two of whom have
children who have suffered vaccine-related injury or death), lawyers,
and officials from relevant agencies. Even more pointedly, the
117
National Institutes of Health (NIH) Revitalization Act of 1993
authorizes the secretary of HHS to appoint an Ethics Advisory
118
Board. If such a board is appointed, it must have between fourteen
and twenty members, including at least one attorney, one ethicist, one
practicing physician, one theologian, and no fewer than one-third but

114. Id. at 334.
115. Id. at 336.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2)(A) (2006).
117. National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-43, 107 Stat.
126 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 289a-1(b)(5)(2006).
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no more than one-half of the members may be “scientists with
119
substantial accomplishments in biomedical or behavioral research.”
Most generally, the Federal Advisory Committee Act indirectly
requires that “the membership of . . . advisory committee[s] . . . be
120
fairly balanced.”
Requirements of this sort trade off some scientific competence,
at the margin, for greater representation of affected interests and
reduced correlation of errors at the group level. Individual epistemic
competence of the panel members is just one good, which should be
optimized, not maximized; balanced panels of this sort can create
overall gains by sacrificing some expertise for a reduced chance that
the biases of any one affected interest will dominate. In the case of
the NIH Revitalization Act of 1993, the lower bound on biomedical
scientists (at least one-third of the panel) promotes expertise, and the
upper bound (no more than one-half of the panel) promotes
epistemic diversity by restricting the representation of a particular
scientific subfield. Similarly, a diversity of affected interests minimizes
the chance that panel members will deliberately falsify an appearance
of consensus in order to maximize their influence. Because diverse
interests will predictably have crosscutting agendas, the chances that
the panel can agree on a single position are reduced; more likely is
open disagreement, providing more information to agencies and
reviewing courts.
The cost of epistemic diversity is a slightly increased chance that
some members of a panel will believe something truly bizarre—that
lead is beneficial or that last week’s cold weather shows that climate
121
change is not occurring. Under the approach I am suggesting, the
agency would be barred from simply rejecting these conclusions on
the first-order ground that the agency knows them to be false. Yet in
order for these bizarre views to make any difference, they must (1)
obtain the agreement of a majority of panel members, expert as well
as nonexpert, (2) under circumstances in which the agency has no
valid second-order reason to reject the panel’s conclusions. The
wackier the error, the less likely it is that those additional two
conditions will hold, so this is another self-limiting problem.
The consequences for administrative law and judicial review are
straightforward. When requirements of epistemic diversity are in
119. Id. § 289a-1(b)(5)(C).
120. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 §5(b)(2) (2006).
121. Thanks to Lisa Heinzerling for these examples.
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place, courts should be reluctant to accept an agency’s appeal to
systematic disciplinary, professional, or industry-based bias. When an
expert panel is drawn solely from a narrow professional subcategory
or subdiscipline, or staffed largely by representatives from a
particular industry or segment of industry, an agency appeal to bias
should be taken more seriously.
To illustrate the right analysis, CASAC is a possible target for an
agency challenge of this sort; but the challenge is weak and should
fail. The overall Science Advisory Board is required by the board’s
charter to be comprised of “independent experts in the fields of
science, engineering, economics, and other social sciences to provide
a range of expertise required to assess the scientific and technical
122
aspects of environmental issues.” Here, all panel members are
scientists and technicians, but not from any particular discipline or
scientific field, in accordance with the statute’s mandate for
“diversity” and “a range of expertise.” CASAC, a committee of the
Science Advisory Board with an independent statutory charter, is
diverse across professions as well as within scientific disciplines; it
contains, at a minimum, a physician and a state environmental
official, in addition to scientists and engineers of various types.
K. Groupthink and Judgment Falsification
In general, agencies should be allowed to depart from the views
of experts when there is good reason to think that herding or
groupthink has occurred. In these cases, the agency has a valid
second-order reason for discounting an expert majority view, or
consensus; if the problem is serious, the agency’s first-order view may
be the only independently formed first-order view in the field. Here
there is a good deal of overlap with the vague idea of “bias,”
interpreted in its epistemic rather than motivational sense. Even if the
goal of all panel members is to get the answer right, copying of others’
views, although individually rational, can make the group decision
uninformed.
Although various forms of groupthink are a real concern, there
are two relevant cautions. First, the mere fact that some experts on a
panel follow the views of other experts does not amount to
groupthink, or necessarily reduce the overall epistemic competence of
122. U.S. EPA, U.S. EPA CHARTER: EPA SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD ¶ 10 (2007),
available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/WebBOARD/currentcharter?Open
Document.
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the group. If panel members defer to a highly competent opinion
leader, group epistemic competence can increase overall.
Equivalently, herding or information cascades cannot be inferred
from the bare fact that some members of the panel copy the views of
others. If the copying members have metaexpertise—if they are quite
adept at figuring out who among them are the best experts—then
123
copying can actually improve the group’s overall performance. The
copiers “may be poor meteorologists, but good judges of
124
meteorologists.”
Second, the risk of groupthink is sensitive to the composition and
structure of the panel and the decisionmaking processes it uses.
Accordingly, agencies will have valid second-order reasons to
discount the consensus of expert panels when they can point to
features of the panel’s composition, structure, or decisionmaking
process that raise red flags. When an expert panel is all drawn from
the same subfield; when experts vote or express judgments in
sequence and with knowledge of each others’ views; when experts are
uncompensated or when their compensation is a function of
individual rather than group performance; and when a panel’s views
are completely unanimous on an issue the agency has independent
reason to think is at least difficult, then the risk of harmful groupthink
is at an apogee and reviewing courts should take the agency’s secondorder concerns most seriously.
L. The Unanimity Dilemma
Special problems arise when an expert panel is unanimous or
reports consensus without a formal vote. In these cases, both agencies
and reviewing courts are in something of an epistemic dilemma.
Unanimity can arise either because all experts on the panel, whatever
their biases, are receiving a strong and uniform signal from reality
about an issue of fact or causation. It can also be a sign of herding,
cascades, or judgment falsification. Unanimity is epistemically
ambiguous. By contrast, the most powerful expert consensus is a
supermajority that is not unanimous. The open dissent shows that the
supermajority’s view has been epistemically tested by vigorous
disagreement, yet has still prevailed.

123. David Coady, When Experts Disagree, 3 EPISTEME 68, 71 (2006).
124. Id. at 72.
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Unanimity, then, is both potentially powerful and potentially
suspect. Under what conditions is it most likely to be one or the
other? When reviewing courts have a prior belief that the issue is an
easy one, or that the facts lean strongly in one direction, unanimity is
best taken as a warning that an agency’s contrary view would lack any
basis in fact. In most regulatory issues that reach the stage of final
agency action, however, and for which an expert panel has been
appointed, it is unlikely in the extreme that the issue is antecedently
known to be an easy one, or that the facts overwhelmingly favor one
view. In these circumstances, unanimity is likely to be suspect,
whereas disagreement within the panel should actually increase the
agency’s, and the reviewing court’s, epistemic confidence in the
conclusions of the panel majority or supermajority.
One implication, somewhat counterintuitive, is that agencies
should not generally be allowed to impeach the conclusions of a panel
majority by claiming that disagreement within the panel shows that
the minority view is reasonable. It may be so, but the question is
where agencies and reviewing courts should place their epistemic
bets: with the minority or with the majority. The logic of expert
aggregation suggests that placing epistemic bets on panel majorities is
the better course, on average. And if panels collectively desire to
maximize the chance the agency will adopt their recommendations, a
legal rule that allows agencies to impeach panel conclusions by
pointing to reasonable dissent will give panels incentives to falsify an
appearance of consensus, thus suppressing useful information.
In the 2006 controversy over fine particulate matter, the
administrator pointed out that the CASAC subcommittee was not
unanimous, as a basis for differing from its recommendations. This
argument is doubly misguided. The questions at issue were hardly
simple, whatever their correct resolution. CASAC’s decision,
endorsed by a large but nonunanimous supermajority, actually
offered firmer grounds for epistemic confidence than a unanimous
one, by showing that relevant arguments had been ventilated; using
non-unanimity as a basis for rejecting the panel’s views gives CASAC
members a heightened incentive to create a false appearance of
consensus in the future. Happily, the reviewing court paid no heed to
125
the administrator’s observation.
125. See Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, No. 06-1410, 2009 WL 437050 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 24,
2009) (per curiam) (failing to discuss the Administrator’s attempt to impeach CASAC’s
recommendation).
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M. An Undemanding Presumption
Although we have canvassed a range of second-order reasons to
which agencies might appeal, the judicial task under this framework is
not terribly demanding. The structure of the inquiry is a simple
presumption: unless agencies can clearly establish that a valid secondorder reason exists, the agency is obliged to adopt the expert panel’s
factual findings. Although the second-order reasons set out above will
be unfamiliar to some judges, the concepts are not difficult in
themselves. As we have seen, FDA recently drew upon the academic
literature on information cascades to formulate voting rules for its
126
advisory panels, so judges should have little difficulty with these
tools. In comparative terms, the suggested inquiry is no more
demanding, and quite possibly less demanding, than standard hard
look review of the agency’s first-order reasons, which, effectively,
requires judges to decide whether the agency’s substantive scientific
and technical claims are minimally plausible.
CONCLUSION
I will conclude by returning to the puzzles laid out at the
beginning of the introduction and indicating how they should be
resolved under the framework I have suggested. In reverse order:
• When an expert panel is evenly split, as in Oregon Natural
Resources Council v. Daley, the agency should have a tiebreaking
vote, and a first-order reason should be sufficient. The agency’s view
counts for at least one, although for no more than one. On jurytheoretic grounds, the views of half of the panel plus the agency’s
first-order views are more likely to be correct than the views of the
other half of the panel. More pragmatically, there is no obvious
alternative to letting the agency break the tie.
• In the black lung cases, and other cases in which a crisply
defined issue of fact or causation is presented to an agency
adjudicator, nose counting should generally be an acceptable basis for
decision under the arbitrary and capricious or substantial evidence
tests. Nose counting is a rational second-order epistemic strategy; to
require an administrative law judge to disgorge a first-order reason,
such as a medical opinion, in order to arbitrate an expert
disagreement guarantees arbitrary decisionmaking.

126. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 79, at 5.
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• Agencies should be obliged to follow the (super)majority view
of an expert panel, as to matters of fact, causation, or prediction,
unless they can give a valid second-order reason for rejecting that
view—for example, that the panel’s composition made it inadequately
diverse, or that its decisionmaking processes or structure made
groupthink or judgment falsification a serious risk. A hard case arises
where an expert panel is unanimous or reports consensus. Here, the
decision represents either of two epistemic extremes: maximally
persuasive or epistemically suspect.
• EPA’s decisions, in 1979 and 1997, to follow the CASAC
(super)majority were both correct. Neither was consistent with its
2006 decision, in a rulemaking on the same questions, not to follow
the CASAC supermajority; thus the D.C. Circuit correctly held that
the 2006 decision was inadequately reasoned. When, as in the 2006
rulemaking, a large supermajority of a nonunanimous panel reaches a
certain conclusion, the agency will rarely have a valid second-order
reason to depart from the panel’s view. Because of the presence of
dissenters, the epistemic quality of the expert majority is at an
apogee. The administrator’s observation in the 2006 rulemaking that
the expert panel was not unanimous actually undermined his decision
to depart from its conclusions; it gave more reason, not less reason, to
consider his views erroneous.
My largest point, running throughout the foregoing, is that
administrative law inconsistently aggregates expert opinions. Some
decisions are unduly and even irrationally reluctant to grant a formal
role to nose counting of experts or expert panels. Voting by expert
panels is likely, on average, to be an epistemically superior
mechanism for determining facts and causation, and for making
predictions, than is the first-order judgment of agency heads in
rulemaking or adjudication. Many believe that agencies should be
politically accountable to Congress; there are equally strong grounds
to think that they should be epistemically accountable to the
parliament of the experts.

